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The theological discourse mostly focuses on the moral and ethical framework for human 
rights and human dignity. In order to give theological justification to the value and dignity 
of human beings, most theologians point to the imago Dei as theological starting point for 
the design of an anthropology on human dignity. Within the paradigmatic framework of 
democracy, human dignity and human rights have become interchangeable concepts. This 
article aimed to focus not on ethics but on aesthetics: man as homo aestheticus, as well as 
the praxis question regarding the quality of human dignity within the network of human 
relationships. It was argued that human dignity is more fundamental than human rights. 
Dignity as an anthropological construct should not reside in the first place in the imago Dei 
and its relationship to Christology and incarnation theology. Human dignity, human rights 
and human identity are embedded in the basic human quest for meaning (teleology). As 
such, human dignity should, in a practical theological approach to anthropology, be dealt 
with from the aesthetic perspective of charisma, thus the option for inhabitational theology. 
As an anthropological category, human dignity should be viewed from the perspective of 
pneumatology within the networking framework of a ‘spiritual humanism’. In this regard, 
the theology of the Dutch theologian A.A. van Ruler, and especially his seminal 1968 work 
Ik geloof, should be revisited by a pneumatic anthropology within the parameters of practical 
theology.
Introduction
In preparation for this essay, I was so surprised when taking up the work of Ludwig Feuerbach 
(1904) on the essence of the Christian faith: Das Wesen des Christentums, to discover his struggle to 
free traditional, and therefore ‘orthodox theology’, from its God-ideology and to turn theological 
reflection to the praxis issues of life, to the meaning of our being human within social contexts. He 
called this focal point: the wellbeing (heil) of humans (Feuerbach 1904:283). To my mind, the latter 
should be the focal point in a practical theological approach to the human quest for meaning and 
dignity. To what extent is the quest for human dignity, human rights and human wellbeing a 
practical theological question? Or does this question point merely to ‘humanism’?
The August–October 2012 mine strikes in South Africa put anew the question regarding the 
relationship  between  human  dignity  and  human  rights  on  the  agenda  of  the  human  rights 
discourse. On 02 October 2012 there were pictures of violent people on television using the 
slogan: ‘We demand our right to human dignity.’ The next day in the newspaper in a report on 
crime in the Cape Flats, it was pointed out that gangsters claim it as their right to point guns at 
the police. From the viewpoint of the politicians, the approach was to warn the police against 
force and to care for the dignity of the gangsters. From an ethical point of view, some politicians 
argued that police should not defend themselves with guns. In the meantime, a child of 6 years, 
Leeana van Wyk, was severely wounded by the shooting of the gangsters. The mine strikers 
also killed two policemen; 3 days later, police opened fire on a group of protesting miners, some 
of whom were armed, and 34 strikers were killed. Elsewhere, in the name of workers’ rights, 
striking truck drivers set 17 trucks on fire. Some of the drivers were severely wounded and ended 
up in hospital, and all in the name of democracy and human rights.1
Is it possible to demand human dignity as a right? Although human dignity and human rights are 
closely connected (they are to a large extent interconnected), the basic assumption is that human 
dignity is a spiritual concept. It points to the quality and value of our being human within the 
dynamics of relationships. As a spiritual category, human dignity, within the framework of a 
theological anthropology, is a category sui generis. The quest for dignity is a teleological issue; it 
is fundamentally about the significance of human life (acknowledgement and fulfilment) and an 
understanding regarding the beauty of life and the aesthetics of being human. Thus the remark of 
Valadier (2003:50): dignity ‘presupposes a whole anthropology’. 
1.All information sourced by the author from various news reports.
Page 1 of 9
Scan this QR 
code with your 
smart phone or 
mobile device 
to read online.
Read online:Original Research
doi:10.4102/ve.v35i2.876 http://www.ve.org.za
The praxis question: Happy Sindane 
and the human quest for identity 
and dignity
With praxis is meant: the intention of human actions within 
the  dynamics  of  human  relationships.  One  can  call  it  the 
intentionality within practical actions; that is, the teleological 
dimension of practical theological reflection. Praxis describes 
the qualitative dimension of being functions and is therefore 
directly connected to the anthropological quest for meaning, 
dignity and identity. Praxis refers to habitus, which is attitude 
and aptitude as indicators of the ontological quality of our 
beings functions.
In  the  1980s,  Ed  Fairley  (1983:23)  already  advocated  for 
practical theology as the engagement with habitus; habitus as a 
disposition and motivational power within the actions of the 
human soul. The whole of the ministerial praxis is determined 
by  disposition  emanating  from  the  notion  of  salvation 
(our  eschatological  identity).  Disposition  is  an  ontological 
category representing a new state of being and the stance 
of our being human in the presence of God. Thus Fairley’s 
(1983:31) argument to move from the clerical paradigm for 
ministry  into  the  habitus-paradigm:  ‘The  term  “practical 
theology” occurred originally to describe theology/habitus.’ 
As such, ‘practice meant that aspect of the habitus or wisdom 
in which the divine object sets requirements of obedience 
and life’ (Fairley 1983:27).
Habitus,  as  an  anthropological  category,  is  intrinsically  an 
aesthetic  category  (Fairley  2001)  referring  to  the  quality 
of human identity and human dignity. The following case 
of Happy Sindane poses, to my mind, the praxis question 
regarding the value of human life and the aesthetics of being 
functions.2 It reveals the fact that identity is more basic than 
rights. Happy Sindane was born to a White father and a Xhosa 
mother in 1984. Very little is known about his father, Henry 
Nick (German), who was his late mother’s employer. Sindane 
was thrown into the spotlight in 2003 when he claimed to be 
a White boy who had been kidnapped by Black people. In 
2003, he walked into a police station and told the bemused 
cops  that  he  was  a  16-year-old  White  boy  who  had  been 
kidnapped and then raised by a Black family. His quest was 
quite simple: he wanted to find his true family, to be returned 
to them, to reclaim his rightful childhood which was stolen 
from him. It was found by the court that Sindane’s claim was 
a kind of ‘lie’ in order to find identity. It was described by the 
ruling magistrate as an ‘intentional lie’, a kind of provisional 
truth that was emotionally and psychically necessary, even 
though  it  might  not  have  been  factual.  This  ‘intentional 
lie’ masked a child’s refusal to accept his father’s absolute 
rejection and his mother’s disappearance. The lie was a kind 
of survival strategy in his desperate attempt to gain identity. 
After DNA tests, he was identified as Abbey Mzayiya, the 
son of a domestic worker, but chose to use the name Happy 
Sindane. 
2.All information provided in this case study was compiled by the author in the light of 
news reports on television and different daily newspapers.
Sindane  made  news  headlines  again  in  2013  when  his 
body  was  found  in  a  ditch  early  on  Monday  morning 
01 April, less than 2 km from his home. A passer-by found 
his battered body lying on a rocky, litter-strewn piece of veld 
in Tweefontein, Mpumalanga. He had been stoned to death. 
There  had  allegedly  been  an  altercation  over  a  bottle  of 
brandy at the JZee tavern where Sindane had been drinking. 
An empty bottle was found near his body. The 58-year-old 
man with whom Sindane had been reportedly fighting in 
the  tavern  was  subsequently  arrested  in  connection  with 
Sindane’s murder. 
Sindane’s biological siblings, the Mzayiyas of Diepsloot in 
Johannesburg,  who  requested  to  have  him  buried  next  to 
his mother in the Eastern Cape, did not attend the funeral 
because they were not consulted about funeral arrangements. 
The real tragedy regarding the death of Sindane is that he 
died even before he was murdered. His life was taken from 
him due to a loss of love and a confused sense of identity. 
The loss of identity ‘killed’ him; one can even say that the 
fear for rejection without an intimate space to be accepted 
unconditionally  for  who  he  was,  was  the  real  cause  of 
his  ‘death’.  A  human  being  without  identity  and  dignity 
becomes  a  ‘thing’  and  mere  ‘commodity’.  At  his  funeral, 
Sindane’s grandmother, Johanna Masombuka, covered his 
coffin with a large blanket, a ritual performed in Ndebele 
culture.  Magistrate  Marthinus  Kruger,  who  had  presided 
over Sindane’s custody matter in 2004, conducted the service, 
reading from Psalm 23.
In the majority of news reports about the events described 
above, it seemed that the focal point in the public discourse 
was  the  rights  of  Happy  Sindane,  but  who  cared  for  the 
dignity  or  beauty  of  Happy  Sindane?  Is  the  quest  and 
demand for human rights perhaps not fundamentally linked 
to a qualitative question: what is the character of a human 
being’s dignity and identity? 
Human rights: A luxury within the 
hell of slums?
It  seems  that  within  poor  communities  in  Africa,  the 
discourse on human rights is, to a large extent, a luxury. The 
basic praxis question is how to survive and not to lose your 
human dignity. Zanotelli (2002:13–15), in the publication The 
slums, describes the slums of Nairobi as the hell of life. The 
slums are usually placed below the sewer line. Within this 
environment, in order to pose the above question on human 
dignity,  you  first  need  to  wash  away  your  materialism, 
rationalism  and  ‘baroque  Catholicism’  (Zanotelli  2002:15). 
The next step is to descend into the hell of the slums; you 
need to undergo the baptism of the poor in order to talk 
about dignity: 
You learn to read things upside down. Your worldview, your 
theology, even your morality, just goes to pieces. When I try to 
dissuade young girls from going to town for prostitution they 
tell me there is no other way to survive. ‘But you are sure to meet 
Aids!’ I insist, ‘It’s OK! Die of Aids or die of hunger, what’s the 
Page 2 of 9Original Research
doi:10.4102/ve.v35i2.876 http://www.ve.org.za
Page 3 of 9
difference? Or maybe there is! You have a chance of longer life 
with Aids’. I understood that what I held as morality is, to a large 
extent, middle class morality. (Zanotelli 2002:14) 
Problem identification
Owing  to  the  democratic  ideal,  Christian  spirituality  has 
been  hijacked  by  political  democratisation.  It  is  indeed 
true:  dignity  (spiritual  realm)  and  rights  (political  realm) 
complement  each  other.  They  complement  each  other 
because  Christianity  provides  a  spiritual  foundation  for 
the  democratic  principles  of  equality  and  liberty,  whilst 
democracy  offers  a  practical  system  of  government  that 
suits Christian ‘concerns for human dignity and depravity’ 
(Kraynak  2003:105).  Although  complementary,  spirituality 
(Varga 2007:157) is more fundamental; it makes life sacred 
and open to the individual (Berger, in Giorgian 2007:170).
The challenge to a theological anthropology is to describe 
the  dynamics  between  dignity  and  meaning  within  the 
parameters of a spiritual hermeneutics in order to understand 
better how, eventually, identity is related to human dignity 
and the spiritual quest for meaning and destiny. Meaning 
is spiritual and, according to Gräb (2006:52), an indication 
of  meaningful  self-expression  (Selbstdeutung);  meaning 
and destiny then not in the sense of a fixed purpose-driven 
agenda, but an understanding of the quality of life in order 
to create a humane, safe environment and space for human 
interaction.  According  to  Flory  and  Miller  (2007:201–218) 
‘expressive  communalism’  displays  a  kind  of  immediate 
artistic expression of meaningful living, what one can call 
an ‘embodied spirituality’. In order to do this, the notion of 
aesthetics should be first on the agenda of human dignity 
and processes of democratisation.
Within  a  context  of  living  below  the  sewer  line,  social 
violence, crime and fraud, the relationship between human 
rights and human dignity indeed become a burning issue. 
Should human rights be founded in human dignity and not 
vice versa? If one is deprived of all forms of human rights, can 
human dignity still prevail, as in the case of Happy Sindane? 
Hypothesis
My basic hypothesis is that in order to detect the meaning 
of identity and dignity, and to promote human rights, our 
starting point in the first place should be aesthetics (with the 
emphasis on the value and meaning of human life) and not 
ethics (with the emphasis on moral issues and the tension 
between good and evil). When one starts with human rights, 
the  discourse  runs  the  danger  of  becoming  moralistic  in 
the sense of conditional demands (a moralistic imperative). 
Hobbes’  ‘wolf’  then  dictates  the  claim  for  human  rights. 
However, human beings should be assessed in the first place 
within aesthetics categories (the indicative of being) and not 
from  the  perspective  of  ethical  categories  (the  imperative 
of  being  as  related  to  morality  and  sinfulness).  Theology 
is  basically  a  reflection  on  the  ‘Divine  Beauty’  (Pattison 
2008:109–110); theological ethics emanates from theological 
aesthetics (Murphy 2008:5). 
My second hypothesis is that dignity is not a value inherent 
in the person (Hobbes, in Negt 2003:30); dignity is a relational 
category: 
So  dignity  is  not  an  attribute  peculiar  to  persons  and  their 
singularity; it is a relationship, or rather manifests itself in the 
gesture by which we relate to others to consider them human, 
just as human as we are, even if their appearance suggests non-
humanity, indeed inhumanity. (Valadier 2003:55) 
I cannot ‘claim’ dignity; I am dignity and dignify life within 
the quality of habitus.
Homo aestheticus: Eschatology and 
the beautification of human life
Within traditional Christianity, the notion of ‘beauty’ is often 
absent in theological reflection (Fairley 2001:6); rather, there 
is a kind of indifference which treats beauty as the beast, 
something to be excluded, marginalised or ignored (Fairley 
2001:7).  In  systematic  theology,  human  dignity  is  mostly 
viewed as an ethical issue and not as an aesthetic issue. For 
example, Huber (1996:xvi) links human dignity and human 
rights  to  an  ‘ethics  of  human  dignity’.  Indeed,  ‘Human 
dignity is a packed-up ethical argument. Its lofty status can 
be recognized from the way in which it is written into the 
texts of constitutions’ (Ammicht-Quinn 2003:39). Perhaps, the 
reason why the discourse on human rights mostly focuses on 
dignity as an ethical category is the close connection between 
dignity and human failure (sinfulness).
In  the  debate  on  a  theological  approach  to  anthropology, 
theologians usually point very aptly to the notion of human 
sin  and  the  connection  between  the  corruptio  totalis  and 
human fallibility. In many cases, the reason why Christian 
spirituality  was  hesitant  to  be  engaged  in  the  debate  on 
human dignity and human rights, was the use of the notion 
of the Fall as the starting point for a theological reflection 
on anthropology. For example, the anthropological notion 
of  creation  and  the  ‘image  of  God’  stir  up  the  debate  on 
the doctrine of sin. Hence, the shift in many ‘enlightened’ 
theological circles on human rights to withdraw from the 
doctrine of original sin: 
The  more  uninhibited  and  optimistic  the  talk  was  regarding 
the dignity and abilities of humans, the greater was the need 
to  relativize  and  secularize  the  doctrine  of  original  sin.  The 
doctrine appears – in the form of insight into the finiteness and 
fallibility of humans – merely as a limiting condition of human 
self-realization, no longer a description of the very essence of 
humans. (Huber 1996:120)
Theological aesthetics does not ignore the reality of human 
fallibility, but rather takes as its starting point the exclamation 
of God that the creation of humans was an aesthetic event 
and regarded in the Genesis narrative as excellent and ‘very 
good’. Good then not as an ethical category, but as a meaning 
category detecting destiny, significance and purposefulness 
(telos), as well as an aesthetic category pointing to worth and 
vocation. Theological aesthetics deals with the quality and 
value of our being functions and eschatological status before 
God (coram Deo). Original Research
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In this respect the notion of ethos is most helpful. Ethos refers 
to  virtue  and  attitude,  conduct  and  habitus,  the  essential 
make-up and characteristics of something (human identity). 
Ethos refers to the aesthetics of identity and dignity. In this 
case  identity  represents  the  unique  personal,  individual 
characteristics of a human being (our calling and vocation), 
whilst dignity reflects personal self-value and self-image as 
related to meaning and worth.
Aesthetics  without  ethics  is  not  possible.  Whilst  ethos  is 
connected  to  the  aesthetics  of  value  and  meaning,  ethics 
represents the normative framework of life; it gives direction 
to ethos and represents the imperative within the indicative 
of  aesthetics.  Ethics  represents  the  normative  framework 
for  meaningful  living.  However,  being  and  the  mode  of 
human  existence  (So-sein)  are,  in  a  spiritual  approach  to 
anthropology, more fundamental than doing. The argument 
of Drewermann (1992) points in the same direction. Being, 
and the identity-question ‘Who am I?’ are more fundamental 
than  the  question  ‘What  should  I  do?’.  Inner  truth  and 
knowledge have priority over behaviour and external actions 
(Drewermann 1992:755). The task of hermeneutics is to bring 
the  deeper  levels  of  existential  anxiety  to  consciousness 
and to peace (Drewermann 1991:339). If it fails to do this, a 
hermeneutics of human self-understanding faces the danger 
of becoming merely a process of moralising. 
What then is ‘human’ in human dignity and human rights, 
especially if one takes Hobbes’ notion about the wolf in human 
nature seriously: homo homini lupus (Negt 2003:31)? What then 
is meant by human dignity in a theological anthropology and 
the meaning of life? What is the link between human dignity 
and the notion of a Christian spiritual aesthetics? 
Dignity and beauty from the perspective of 
eschatology 
From a judicial point of view, dignity is mostly associated 
with equality, human rights and the value of people. With 
reference to Kant (in Ackermann 2013:58), one can argue that 
dignity refers to autonomy or freedom. Thus, the hypothesis 
of  Ackermann  (2013:85)  is  that  dignity  connects  with 
concepts  such  as  equality  and  non-discrimination.  In  this 
regard human worth (dignity) becomes a kind of criterion 
in order to detect respect, non-discrimination and equality.
As  stated  above,  in  the  debate  on  the  interplay  between 
human dignity and human rights, the main starting point for 
theological reflection is mostly creation and the notion of the 
image of God. For example, the Italian humanism of the 15th 
century built the notion of human dignity upon the concept 
of humans created in the image of God (Huber 1996:117). 
However, the ‘image of God’ concept in Genesis 1:26 points 
more to qualitative representation within the dynamics of 
relationships than to rights, ethics and morality (Ammicht-
Quinn 2003:41). 
What it means to be truly human is closely connected to the 
fact that human beings live in the presence of God and are 
created in the image of God to present the character and 
identity emanating from the covenantal encounter with God. 
Despite the close identification between dignity and rights in 
the anthropological approach of J. Moltmann (1984:23), the 
following quotation underlines the notion of representation 
within  the  dynamics  of  relationships:  ‘The  image  of  God 
is  human  rights  in  all  their  relationships  in  life.’  Thus  in 
God’s liberating and redeeming action the original destiny 
of human beings is both experienced and fulfilled. In the 
‘image of God’ concept, the divine claim upon human beings 
is expressed (Moltmann 1984:22). 
According to Kraynak (2003:90), the problem with the notion 
of the imago Dei resides in the fundamental difference between 
the biblical and the contemporary understanding of human 
dignity:  ‘In  the  biblical  view,  dignity  is  hierarchical  and 
comparative; in the modern, it is democratic and absolute.’ 
A further problem is that the imago Dei refers not so much to 
inherent dignity, but to representation. It is more a relational 
category; ‘it is also something to be won or lost, merited of 
forfeited, augmented or diminished’ (Kraynak 2003:91).
Owing to the emphasis on aesthetics rather than ethics, our 
point of departure is not the creation paradigm but the re-
creational paradigm of eschatological thinking. Eschatology 
and its emphasis on justification views human beings from 
the perspective of who we already are in Christ (spiritual 
ontology).  Our  identity  is  determined  by  salvation  and 
grace. We are accepted unconditionally for who we are. It is 
not what we do that is fundamental for the quality of ethos, 
but who we are. The indicative of salvation determines the 
imperative, which emanates from the eschatological character 
of salvation. ‘The imperative does not appeal to Christian’s 
good  will  or  ability,  but  recalls  what  they  have  already 
received in baptism: freedom and a new Lord [the indicative]’ 
(Schrage 1988:176). What is therefore required is not that we 
do something, but that we be something (some-body) (Schrage 
1988:43). The crucial point is the transformation and metanoia 
of  the  individual  (transformation  of  stance,  conduct  and 
orientation, the telos of life) in terms of intention, motivation 
and goal. Thus, Schrage’s conclusion is that Jesus’ ethics was 
an ethics of intention (Schrage 1988:43). 
The salvific nature of the kingdom of God determines our 
ontological stance in both life and death. The character of the 
kingdom determines human conduct (Schrage 1988:37). This 
character of the kingdom can be captured by the theological 
notion  of  eschatology.  Because  of  eschatology,  the  will  of 
God  cannot  be  deduced  from  any  universally  recognised 
ontological  order  as  in  the  case  of  the  so-called  ethics  of 
natural law. The status quo cannot be preserved as in the case 
of the doctrine of creation in ethics. God’s will is enacted in 
the eschatological act of salvation. 
The important point to grasp in an eschatological approach 
is  that  human  conduct  (habitus)  is  a  consequence,  not  a 
condition, of parousia. Within the coming of God’s kingdom, 
this eschatological stance and understanding of consequential 
pneumatological action is the impetus for meaning. When Original Research
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we  do  not  cooperate  and  embody  this  eschatological  and 
pneumatological realm, the indicative of salvation becomes 
judgement.
Ethics is a consequence of eschatology and not a precondition. 
In  this  way  an  eschatological  approach  undermines 
perfectionism and legalism. What is most needed is wisdom 
(sapientia)  in  order  to  beautify  human  life;  the  aesthetic 
presence of unconditional love: ‘Presence embodies grace’ 
(Augsburger 1986:36).
Within a pneumatological paradigm, the human being is not 
assessed in terms of an opportunistic approach, which implies 
that all relationships are fine when they only embody God’s 
presence through empathetic responses. In an opportunistic 
approach the focal point is merely individual need satisfaction 
and  the  maintenance  of  basic  human  rights.  Neither  are 
humans assessed in terms of a pessimistic approach, which 
implies that human beings are merely sinners and doomed 
to  failure.  In  a  pneumatological  approach,  human  beings 
are assessed realistically. A realistic approach in spirituality 
means  that  as  Christians  we  are  already  new  beings  in 
Christ. In Christ, humans are endowed with the fruits of the 
Spirit (Gl 6:22–26). Human beings in Christ are ‘charismatic 
human beings’. The reality of the fruit of the Spirit implies a 
pneumatological ontology: one is (eschatological speaking) 
therefore love. From a pneumatological point of view, love 
– as in the case of all the fruit of the Spirit – is now a being 
function and aesthetic category. ‘Do you not know that your 
body is a temple of the Holy Spirit, who is in you, whom you 
have received from God?’ (1 Cor 6:19). 
Eschatological  aesthetics  provides  the  driving  and 
motivational factor for human actions. Eschatology and its 
connection  to  the  theological  notion  of  grace  provide  the 
spiritual,  even  psychic  energy  for  meaningful  living.  For 
Rombach  (1987:379),  dignity  then  describes  the  humane 
human  being  (Der  menschliche  Mensch);  the  human  being 
shaped by the social processes of identity and meaningful 
space (Identität = a spiritual networking of meaning as the 
whole which gives significance to every particular part). 
From human rights to human 
dignity (dignitas) 
Purposefulness as an aesthetic taxonomy of 
human life
To a certain extent the concepts of human dignity and the 
notion  of  the  democratisation  of  life  have  become  closely 
linked to the notion of human rights. According to Huber 
(1996:114), ideas of human dignity and human rights have 
been shaped by a long historical development. In this regard 
respect and equality are interconnected categories.
Within the European tradition, talk of human dignity was 
intertwined with the rank and status of particular persons 
in society. The concept dignity (dignitas) is therefore a social 
category related to that of honour (honor) (Huber 1996:115). 
The  turn  toward  the  human  being  as  the  centrum  of  the 
whole  of  the  cosmos  was  fed  by  the  renaissance  and  the 
humanism  of  the  Enlightenment.  Owing  to  the  Kantian 
influence of human beings as rational beings, the notion of 
human autonomy put an ‘anthropocentric’ worldview in the 
centre of the human dignity debate. Within this worldview 
‘dignity’ has increasingly meant ‘the worth of being human’:
Dignitas  became  closely  associated  with  humanitas  as  to  be 
construed as a synonym. To be able to say what dignity is would 
be to describe the fundamental meaning of being human. (Meeks 
1984:ix)
Dignity means to be human. ‘For this reason, dignity has 
become the key concept in the worldwide struggle for human 
rights’ (Meeks 1984:ix). 
Within  the  human  rights  discourse  it  is  often  extremely 
difficult to differentiate between human rights and human 
dignity.  The  discourse  has  become  ‘slippery’.  Human 
dignity has even become an in-between issue; it is squeezed 
in  between  sanctity  and  depravity  (Witte  2003:119–137), 
between man as beast and man as an angel (merely divine) 
(Meilaender 2009). Mostly, the debate focuses on moral and 
democratic issues within the framework of personal, social 
and political ethics. Moltmann (1984) distinguishes between 
human rights as the quest for freedom, justice and equality, 
whilst dignity refers to how these issues impact on the quality 
of life of the individual, the unique and particular person:
Human rights are plural, but human dignity exists only in the 
singular ... The dignity of humanity is the only indivisible, in 
alienable, and shared quality of the human being. (Moltmann 
1984:9)
Initially, European humanism linked the notion of human 
dignity to the Christian concept of humans created in the 
image of God. Human beings became the microcosm of God, 
containing in them a multitude of choices. One can therefore 
say  that  the  ‘modern  age,  which  began  with  humanism, 
is  characterized  by  the  conviction  that  human  dignity  is 
anchored in the self, namely in one’s rational talents’ (Huber 
1996:117). It was when the recognition of equal dignity of 
all  human  beings  was  incorporated  within  the  politics  of 
democratisation  and  institutionalised  by  international  law 
that the shift from dignity to human rights became a focal 
point for the discourse on the value and worth of human 
beings. The reason perhaps is that human dignity, however, 
requires human rights for its embodiment, protection and 
full flowering (Meeks 1984:xi). One must therefore admit that 
without human rights human dignity becomes a fleeting idea 
without concrete and contextual meaning.
Within  the  tradition  of  Plato,  Aristotle  and  Kant,  dignity 
became mostly related to intelligibility. Dignity then resides 
in the human nous or mind. Eventually dignity and rights 
become qualities of radical rational autonomy: 
On  one  common  reading,  ‘dignity’  refers  to  a  basic  faculty; 
it  denotes  the  bare  capacity  for  intelligent  free  choice  shared Original Research
doi:10.4102/ve.v35i2.876 http://www.ve.org.za
Page 6 of 9
equally  by  all  non-damaged  persons.  One’s  rational  freedom 
may be misused, but the simple possession of it is the ground of 
respect. (Jackson 2003:143)
Meilaender (2009:8) distinguishes between two concepts of 
dignity: human and personal. Human dignity then has to do 
with the powers and the limits characteristic of our species – 
a species marked by the integrated functioning of body and 
spirit. Personal dignity refers to the individual person whose 
dignity calls for our respect whatever his or her powers and 
limits may be. Although human dignity refers to many layers 
of meaning, Meilaender (2009:89) points to equal respect as a 
principle and theoretical basis for human dignity.
Albeit, one should agree with Meeks (in Moltmann 1984:ix) 
that ‘dignity’ is a difficult word to define. It is often used as 
an exchangeable concept for human rights. ‘For this reason, 
dignity has become the key concept in the worldwide struggle 
for human rights’ (Meeks, in Moltmann 1984:ix), a struggle 
embedded in different cultural contexts and deep ideological 
disagreements over human rights. The further problem is that 
dignity defined in many different ways immediately entails 
a  counter-definition  of  others  as  inhuman,  not  possessing 
dignity.
In  his  book  On  human  dignity,  Moltmann  (1984:31)  also 
connects  the  two  concepts  to  one  another:  ‘Through  the 
service of reconciliation, human dignity and right are restored 
in this inhuman world.’ However, the important point in the 
human rights debate is that human dignity determines the 
quality of human rights; hence, the reason to separate the two 
in  order  to  understand  their  interconnectedness.  ‘Human 
rights spring from human dignity and not vice versa’ (Meeks 
1984:xi).  Furthermore,  one  can  conclude  and  say:  human 
rights  presuppose  a  kind  of  fundamental  dignity  and 
therefore a sense of meaning, purposefulness and vocation. 
However, human dignity as a sense of meaning and vocation 
has implications for the quality of being functions. Its link 
with  responsibility  and  purposeful  actions  presupposes 
definite personal qualities and character. This is where the 
interconnectedness  between  identity,  dignity  and  virtues 
come into play.
Virtues and meaningful actions
Kreeft  (1986:192)  argues  that  virtue  is  necessary  for  the 
survival of civilisation, whilst religion is necessary for the 
survival  of  virtue.  Without  moral  excellence,  right  living, 
goodness, purity, chastity and effectiveness, our civilisation 
is on the road to decline. Civilisation needs justice, wisdom, 
courage and temperance.
It was Aristotle who underlined the importance of virtues for 
purposeful actions. To this end he identified four basic virtues 
– prudence, justice, temperance and courage. It is indeed true 
that  Aristotle  and  Homer’s  understanding  of  arete  differs 
from that of the New Testament. The New Testament not 
only promotes virtues such as faith, hope and love, but views 
humility (the moral for slaves) as one of the cornerstones in 
the formation of a Christian character (MacIntyre 1984:245). 
MacIntyre’s  (1984:249)  conclusion  is  of  importance  to  the 
debate on the interplay of values and virtues. In both the 
New  Testament  and  Aristotle’s  comprehension,  despite 
differences, virtue has this in common: it empowers a person 
to attain that characteristic essential for attaining meaning 
and significance (telos). 
Virtues motivate people and bring about integrity (Crossin 
1998).  They  represent  enthusiasm  for  life  (enthusiasm  = 
literally,  God  within  us)  and  become  a  driving  force  that 
enables one to establish and nurture life-giving and healthy 
relationships.  They  safeguard  human  dignity  and  bring 
about a human space of moral soulfulness. Sound values are 
part and parcel of spiritual health; vice points in the direction 
of spiritual pathology and ‘moral illness’. Virtues could be 
viewed as identity made visible in habitus and the quality of 
human  relationships.  Virtues  display  identity  (Meilaender 
1984) and reveal the character of our being functions; they 
exhibit the character of the human soul and are tested and 
displayed within the realm of relationships.
Human dignity and human identity: 
Towards a relational approach
The argument up to now has been that identity is a qualitative 
concept  and  connected  to  the  value  of  inter-human  and 
intra-human  communication.  Human  dignity  and  human 
identity should therefore be viewed as relational categories. 
Relation refers to intimacy and interconnectedness; it can, 
inter  alia  within  the  framework  of  African  spirituality,  be 
linked to a kind of ubuntu-philosophy, namely that a human 
being is only humane through the relationship with another 
human beings. What is envisaged in an African spirituality is 
harmony in interpersonal relationships: umuntu ungumuntu 
ngabantu or motho ke motho ka batho – approximately translated 
as:  ‘a  person  is  a  person  through  other  people’  (Mtetwa 
1996:24). Life can therefore only be healed if relationships are 
healed.
It is a fact that the notion of relationality was often questioned 
as a reliable and valid approach. The critical point is then that 
human beings often act in relationships with enmity, hatred, 
anger and violence rather than with unconditional love. Our 
love is most of times conditional. Hobbes’ terse slogan that 
man is wolf to man (homo homini lupus) is from a sociological 
point of view indeed relevant. However, it is argued here 
that from a pneumatological point of view, theology should 
revisit the slogan: ‘man is man to man’ (homo homini homo); 
the  term  ‘human’  then  stands  for  the  capability  to  have 
empathy, solidarity and cooperation (in Huber 1996:118). As 
a relational, systemic and process category, dignity is closely 
related to identity as well as to integrity and congruency.
The interplay between dignity, identity, integrity 
and congruency 
For  the  aim  of  this  essay,  identity  can  be  described  as  a 
process of personal identification consisting of the interplay 
between:Original Research
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•	 Intra-processes of self-understanding and self-evaluation 
(Who am I?). Intra-spection as a critical assessment of 
ability, skill and level of responsibilities.
•	 Inter-processes  of  role-function  and  feedback  (How 
do  I  respond  and  perform?  Mirroring  oneself  within 
relationships:  level  of  acceptance  or  rejection).  Inter-
spection  as  a  critical  evaluation  of  the  quality  of 
interrelated networking.
•	 External  processes  regarding  norms,  values,  belief 
systems,  world  views  and  paradigms  (The  factor  of 
motivation  with  the  questions:  What  keeps  me  going? 
And to what do I commit myself?) Trans-spection as a 
critical  assessment  of  these  norms,  values  and  belief 
systems  that  determine  responsible  behaviour  and 
informed decision-making (normative framework of life).
•	 Contextual  issues  embedded  in  culture  (What  shapes 
my  life  and  influences  the  quality  of  decision-making 
and life choices?). Interculturality: the mutual exchange 
between particularity within a specific context, customs 
and habits and the global structures that determines life 
on a daily basis. At stake in our global society are inter alia 
technology, social media and virtual reality.
‘Identity’, as derived from the Latin idem, indicating the same, 
conveys the idea of continuity. Identity presumes a continuity 
between the human I and behaviour; hence, the importance 
of congruency. Congruency happens when the self is a true 
reflection and portrayal of the conduct and experiences of the 
human I (Möller 1980:94). Congruency is about remaining 
faithful  to  oneself,  communicating  authenticity  and  truth 
(Heitink  1977:69).  It  is  about  the  question  to  what  extent 
one’s  belief  system  correlates  with  actions,  lifestyles  and 
behaviour.
Identity  is  a  dynamic  process.  The  development  of 
identity,  therefore,  is  not  linear,  but  a  zigzag  movement 
between  experiences  of  the  human  I  and  the  response  of 
the environment. The movement acts like a spiral in which 
experiences of life during each stage of human development 
play  a  decisive  role.  The  factors  of  discontinuity  and 
continuity, as well as acceptance and rejection, will determine 
the quality of the identification and therefore of identity. The 
level of congruency will create a sense of integrity depending 
on the norms and values internalised.
Identity and vocation: The principle of 
responsibility
The answer to the question: ‘Who am I?’ depends on the 
quality of the human reaction and on the degree and quality 
of  human  responsibility.  Our  basic  point  of  departure  is 
therefore  the  core  principle  that  qualifies  ethos  (attitude 
and  aptitude)  in  human  behaviour:  respondeo  ergo  sum.  In 
a  theological  anthropology,  ‘identity’  means  that  people 
discover  that  God  calls  them  to  respond  to  their  destiny: 
to love God and their fellow human beings. People should 
therefore display the quality of their responsibility and the 
genuineness and sincerity of their obedience to God in the 
way that they love. 
The principle of responsibility, which leads in turn to self-
acceptance, presupposes awareness. People within a specific 
stage  of  development  need  to  be  aware  that  they  should 
display  real  insight  in  the  specific  claim  made  on  their 
personal  functions  during  this  stage.  Their  development 
and growth is determined by the extent to which they accept 
responsibility for the development of their potentials in life. 
A developmental model in a pastoral anthropology should 
always  deal  with  the  ethical  principle  of  love,  because  it 
is  an  important  director  in  the  process  of  disclosing  and 
discovering inner potentials.
We can conclude that identity as an indication of maturity 
and adulthood presupposes a process of maturation in which 
different polarities, indicating the critical challenges implied 
by human life, play a decisive role. Whether identity takes 
place and diffusion is overcome will determine the quality of 
adulthood: intimacy, generativity and integrity. Meaning is 
then interconnected to adulthood and maturity. In terms of 
Erikson’s (1974:28) understanding of the life cycle, fidelity is 
the cornerstone of integrity, identity and maturity: ‘Fidelity 
is the ability to sustain loyalties freely pledged in spite of the 
inevitable contradictions and confusions of value systems.’ 
Virtue therefore determines the quality of human identity 
and human dignity; it describes the humanness within our 
being human. One could say that humanity and humanness 
refer  to  the  character  of  our  human  freedom,  that  is,  our 
ability to take responsibility for life and to make responsible 
decisions that will enhance the quality of life.
Towards a pneumatological understanding of 
dignity and aesthetics
To conceptualise dignity is indeed difficult. Dignity is a many 
layered concept:
•	 Dignity (dignitas) within a hierarchical paradigm points 
to status, position and authority.
•	 Dignity (dignitas) within an ethical paradigm points to 
equality, justice and rights within the quest for liberation.
•	 Dignity  (dignitas)  within  an  aesthetic  paradigm 
points  to  meaning,  telos  (purposefulness,  destiny  or 
significance) and intimacy: the basic quest to be accepted 
unconditionally  for  who  you  are;  the  essence  of  the 
humanum. 
•	 Dignity (dignitas) as a spiritual and theological category. 
In theology dignity refers to the value of human life as 
determined and defined by the eschatological aesthetics 
of a suffering God. This suffering puts God on the bottom 
line  of  life,  ‘below  the  sewer  line’  (Zanotelli  2002:15), 
within the hell of the slums. The ‘ugliness’ of dereliction 
(My God, my God why has you forsaken me?) beautifies 
life unconditionally, despite life under the bottom line. 
Spiritual  aesthetics  therefore  determine  the  quality  of 
human  dignity  and  ethics.  Garcia-Rivera  (2008:177) 
remarks as follows: ‘This em-pathos, mediated by their 
own distinct accounts through the beauty of the crucifix, 
in turn becomes, second, syn-pathos – a plea for divine 
sympathy with their own suffering’.Original Research
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The  aesthetics  of  life  emanate  from  this  eschatological 
proposition:  in  Christ  human  beings  are  already  a  new 
creation;  this  is  our  Christian  spiritual  identity.  Owing  to 
our eschatological identity, being functions qualify knowing 
functions, doing functions and feeling functions This new 
spiritual  ontology  is  enfleshed  and  exhibited  in  the  fruit 
of the Spirit. Pneumatology beautifies life by means of the 
charisma of the Spirit and the service (diakonia) of the church. 
Thus, the reason why one can conclude and say that human 
dignity, as a theological concept in a pastoral anthropology, 
is primarily a pneumatological endeavour. Dignified by the 
Holy Spirit, life and our being human becomes beautiful. As 
Christians, we should then display the fruit of the Spirit and, 
in doing so, Christians would start to beautify life and grant 
others human dignity.
Aesthetics can inspire human beings to transcend the harsh 
conditions of inhumane living. It is most interesting to read 
narratives of people who survived under harsh conditions 
of suffering. In many cases, the factor that has kept people, 
robbed from their human dignity, going, was not ethics but 
aesthetics. In his autobiography, Moltmann (2008) comments 
as  follows  whilst  referring  to  his  concentration  camp 
experience: 
We were pushing a goods truck, and suddenly I stood in front 
of a blossoming cherry tree. I almost fainted with joy of it. After 
a long period of blindness without any interest, I saw colours 
again and sensed life in myself once more. Life began to blossom 
afresh. (p. 27)
Conclusion
Towards a paradigm shift in a theological 
anthropology: Humanum determined by 
pneuma
For  the  connection  between  aesthetics  and  a  Christian 
spiritual  approach  to  dignity,  a  theological  anthropology 
needs  the  following  paradigm  shift:  from  incarnation 
theology  to  inhabitation  theology.  The  praxis-question  in 
anthropology should eventually reside in pneumatology and 
not in Christology. For this paradigmatic shift, the theology 
of  the  Dutch  theologian  A.A.  van  Ruler  (1968)  is  most 
relevant and should be revisited. Why? Within incarnation 
theology  the  human  being  is  nothing  (homo  peccator)  and 
God  is  everything  (sacrificial  grace):  Christ  is  mediator. 
Christology is about redemption. In inhabitational theology, 
man, the human being, is becoming ‘whole’ (homo aestheticus) 
and therefore ‘everything’ (humanum); human beings are not 
excluded in salvation (heil, sjalom), but totally incorporated 
(Rebel 1981:209) because the humanum is now determined by 
pneuma. 
In terms of pneumatology, Van Ruler points to the category 
of ‘reciprocity’ (Rebel 1981:145), which means that the human 
will starts to correspond with the divine will according to the 
indwelling presence of the Spirit. The human person starts 
to  become  theonomous  and  therefore  fully  authentic  and 
autonomous; that is, it displays the charisma of the Spirit (the 
soulfulness of embodied humanism). 
To build in any concurrency between God and human beings 
is pagan idolatry (Rebel 1981:99); pneumatology rather creates a 
theological osmosis (Van Ruler, in Rebel 1981:85) between 
God  and  human  beings.  Sin  is  secondary,  eschatological 
being  is  primary.  In  an  Christological  anthropology,  the 
object  of  faith  is  salvation  (heil  =  becoming  whole);  in  a 
pneumatic anthropology, the object of salvation is the praxis 
of  humanum  (Rebel  1981:140).  A  pneumatic  anthropology 
describes  spiritual  wholeness  (a  spiritual  humanism);  it 
determines the quality of human dignity (charisma as pneuma-
beauty) as well as the rights of man (aesthetic responsibility).
‘Man is homo festivus and fantasia homo’ (Cox 1969:11). One 
can even say that the attempt to formulate the Christian faith 
in rational categories and to define God in terms of a correct 
doctrine (true confession), turned the Christian faith in the 
direction  of  scientia  (scientific  knowledge,  the  positivistic 
knowledge of the mind), rather than to sapientia (wisdom 
and the devotional knowledge of the heart). As Cox (1969:10) 
very aptly remarked: ‘Scientific method directs our attention 
away from the realm of fantasy and toward the manageable 
and the feasible.’ However, man as homo aestheticus points 
in  the  direction  of  the  sapientia  of  beauty:  the  passionate 
expression of redemptive grace and sensitive benevolence.
In Christian spirituality, aesthetics as the wellbeing (heil) of 
human beings should reckon with two important categories: 
doxa  and  charisma.  Within  a  Christian  spiritual  approach 
dignity  should  be  linked  to  habitus  as  a  reflection  of  the 
glory of God. ‘Glory (doxa) is the closest word to dignity 
in  the  New  Testament’  (Kraynak  2003:93).  Furthermore, 
dignity as a spiritual category cannot avoid the notion of 
grace and unconditional, sacrificial love (the eschatological 
qualification)  and  the  fruit  of  the  Spirit  (charisma)  (the 
pneumatological qualification). Hence our finding that human 
dignity and human rights reside as spiritual categories in the 
fact that dignity is enfleshed in human bodies as a result of 
the indwelling presence of the Holy Spirit; human dignity is 
a matter of inhabitational theology.
Identity  (characteristics),  dignity  (meaning  and  worth), 
ethos  (habitus  and  pathos)  and  ethics  (responsibility  and 
human  rights)  describe  an  interconnected  dynamics  of 
networking relationships. This networking can be described 
as a hermeneutics of ‘soulful human being’. An aesthetics of 
identity  and  dignity  presupposes  the  following  paradigm 
shift:  from  psycho-autonomy  (self-determination)  to 
pneuma-relationality – the intimate space of unconditional 
love  as  framed  by  koinonia  and  diakonia.  In  terms  of  this 
prenumatological  and  eschatological  perspective  one  can 
claim: Happy Sindane was beautiful. Unfortunately, within 
the  relational  dynamics  of  life,  he  was  never  exposed  to 
the  homo  aesthicus  inherent  to  a  theological  anthropology. 
Perhaps the praxis of theology failed Happy Sindane. From 
a  practical  theological  perspective  I  must  admit:  it  seems 
that the koinonia and diakonia failed to promote the beauty 
of Happy Sindane. A rhino without a horn has no identity. 
Sindane died without a horn. His legacy: an intentional lie 
caused by existential unfulfilment and relational ‘ugliness’.Original Research
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Instead of a provisional truth, could it perhaps be possible 
that  a  spiritual  aesthetics,  and  the  discovery  of  the  link 
between  identity  and  an  eschatological  understanding  of 
homo aestheticus, could have provided a praxis framework 
for an existential truth in order to discover the quality of our 
being human?
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